Abstract. At PKC 2003 Paeng, Jung, and Ha proposed a lattice based public key cryptosystem(PJH). It is originated from GGH, and designed as a hybrid of GGH and NTRUEncrypt in order to reduce the key size. They claimed that PJH is secure against all possible attacks, especially against lattice attacks. However, in this paper, we present a key recovery attack, based on lattice theory, against PJH. The running time of our attack is drastically short. For example, we could recover all secret keys within 10 minutes even for the system with n = 1001 on a single PC. Unlike other lattice attacks against NTRUEncrypt and GGH, the attack may be applied well to the system with much larger parameters. We present some clues why we believe so. Based on this belief, we declare that PJH should not be used in practice.
Introduction
Since Ajtai's seminal work [1] , some lattice-based public-key cryptosystems [2, 4, 5] have been suggested inspired by his work. Among them GGH [4] and NTRU [5] attracted much attention because both systems seemed to be practical with fast encryption/decryption and reasonable key size. GGH is a lattice version of the previously well-known code-based cryptosystems [9] . Though its key size is somewhat large, the system is fast. The proposers claimed that the system with practically usable parameters would be secure. A few years later, however, Nguyen presented a powerful lattice attack against it [12] . In order for GGH to be secure against Nguyen's attack, its key size should be too large to be practical. Thus, GGH has been regarded as a broken system since then. NTRU, more precisely NTRUEncrypt, is another lattice-based system widely reviewed. The system is very efficient and unbroken till now. From the lattice-theoretic point of view, NTRUEncrypt is a special instance of GGH in the sense that the former uses a circulant matrix for a public key while the latter uses a random square matrix. As a result, the key size of NTRUEncrypt is O(n) while that of GGH is O(n 2 ), where n is the dimension of the matrix. A few years after Nguyen's attack, Paeng, Jung, and Ha proposed a variant [18] of GGH, which we will call PJH in this paper. Motivations of developing such a variant are as follows: Firstly, one-way function of GGH has still merits since it is simple and faster than other systems using modular exponentiations. Secondly, at the time that PJH was suggested, it seemed to be easier to design a natural signature scheme based on GGH than on NTRUEncrypt, although both signature schemes turned out to be insecure recently [13] . Thirdly, it seems to be possible to overcome Nguyen's attack by choosing lattices more carefully. With these in mind, they designed PJH as a hybrid type of GGH and NTRUEncrypt: PJH looks similar to GGH except that it takes a partially circulant matrix for a public key. As a result, its key size reduces down to O(n), which is same as that of NTRUEncrypt. Concerning the security of PJH, the proposers claimed that it would be secure against all possible attacks with practical key sizes. Because GGH was broken by a lattice attack, they presented extensive analysis on the security against lattice attacks, and concluded that their system would be secure on the basis of various simulation results.
However, in this paper, we present a key recovery attack against PJH with a lattice technique. In order to recover the secret keys, we induce a linear equation from the public information on key pairs. Then, we construct a lattice from the equation and obtain some of the secret keys by applying lattice reduction algorithms to the lattice. The remaining secret keys can be recovered simply by solving a few linear equations. We could recover secret keys within 10 minutes even for the system with n = 1001, where n is a system parameter which will be described in the next section. Unlike other lattice attacks against NTRUEncrypt and GGH, our attack may be applied well to the system of much larger n's. We present some clues why we believe so. Based on this belief, we declare that PJH should not be used in practice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly introduce PJH and describe basic principles of general lattice attacks against public key cryptosystems. In Section 3, we present our key recovery attack, simulation results, and applicability of our attack against the system with much larger parameters. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.
Preliminaries

Overview of PJH Cryptosystem
Notations and Parameters Let n be a prime integer, and consider a polynomial ring
We identify a polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + a n−1 x n−1 ∈ R with a vector (a 0 , a 1 , · · · , a n−1 ) ∈ Z n . We will denote both by f . Note that the multiplication f · g of f and g is computed by the convolution product of them, that is,
Then, it is easy to verify the following:
Finally, we remark that we will use row-oriented notations in matrix representations of lattices while PJH adopts column-oriented rotations in [18] .
Key Generation In order to generate a private key, PJH generates 4 polynomials f 1 , f 2 , h 1 , h 2 ∈ R which have the following properties: The private key R is defined by
Let p be a positive integer. In [18] p is a 10-bit or 80-bit integer which need not be prime. Proposers recommended that p is kept secret although it does not affect the security. In order to generate public keys, PJH chooses g ∈ R with
Now, four public polynomials P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ∈ R are defined as follows:
(1) The public key B is defined by
The pair (R, B) constructed in this way have the same properties as that in GGH. That is, R and B are different bases of a same lattice and have low and high dual-orthogonality defects, respectively. For more details, we refer the readers to [18] .
Encryption and Decryption For a message
2 , where the coefficients of e i are elements in {−1/2, 1/2}.
Let T be a matrix defined by
Then, c can be decrypted as follows:
The decryption works similarly to that of GGH. Since we don't have to understand thoroughly how the decryption works in order to explain our attack, we omit the details.
Efficiency and Security Since the public matrix B is determined by four polynomials in R, key size of PJH is O(n) while that of GGH is O(n 2 ). The comparison of key sizes of PJH with GGH in [18] is given in Table 1 . The values in the last column are the key size of GGH when it uses Micciancio's HNF expression [10] .
Concerning the security of PJH, the proposers claimed that the system is secure against all possible attacks even if the parameter p is disclosed. Because GGH was broken by a lattice attack, they presented extensive analysis on the security against lattice attacks. We briefly describe their analysis. Because the equations in (1), which are the only public information on secret keys and public keys, are quadratic of unknown variables in R, they expected that no key recovery attack using lattice techniques would be feasible. On the other hand, a message recovery attack seems to be feasible. However, they claimed that the reduction algorithm would work badly because they made expected-gaps, which is defined in the next subsection, small. Running times to break PJH estimated by the authors of [18] are given in Table 2 .
Lattice Attacks
A Lattice L is defined to be a discrete subgroup of R n . It consists of all integral linear combinations of a set of some linearly independent vectors 
is defined by the minimum of max 1≤j≤i v j , where {v 1 , · · · , v i } runs over all possible sets of linearly independent vectors v 1 , · · · , v i ∈ L. The ratio λ 2 /λ 1 is called lattice gap, which is useful in estimating the feasibility of lattice attacks.
Given a basis for a lattice L, the problem of finding a shortest vector of L is called the shortest vector problem (SVP). Another famous problem related to lattices is the closest vector problem (CVP), the problem of finding a vector v ∈ L which is closest to a given vector t ∈ R n . The CVP in ℓ p -norm is proved to be NP-hard for all p, and the SVP is also believed to be hard [11] . Indeed, there are no known polynomial time algorithms to solve even the approximated versions of them, if approximation factors are polynomials in dim(L). However, if the dimension of a lattice is less than a few hundreds, we can solve them in practice using lattice reduction algorithms such as LLL [8] and its variants [19] .
For a given lattice basis {b 1 , · · · , b n }, LLL outputs a reduced basis {b *
integer arithmetic operations, where B is the maximum of b i 2 's. The fastest LLL variant known has bit-complexity essentially O(n 5 log 2 B) [14] . However, the real performances of LLL and its variants are more better than what are expected from the theory, both in terms of the running time and the output quality [15] . Thus, we can find a genuine shortest vector of a given lattice using the algorithms when the dimension of the lattices are less than a few hundreds.
Lattices have been widely used in attacking public-key cryptosystems. Readers are referred to [16] for well-written summary of the various results about them. Here we briefly describe basic principles to attack systems using lattices. The attacks are accomplished by reducing the problem of finding a secret information in the system to a specific instance of SVP or CVP. We describe the SVP case here. First, one constructs a lattice from public information such as system parameters and public keys. Then, one shows that a relatively short vector v of the lattice includes the secret information we want to obtain, and finds such v by solving SVP with lattice reduction algorithms. However, in most cases, one cannot prove that v is a genuine shortest vector of the lattice. Instead, one can infer that it is a shortest vector by using Gaussian heuristic: Given a random lattice L of dimension n, the first minimum
One use σ(L) as the estimation of λ 1 (L), where σ(L) (briefly σ) is defined by
If v is less than σ, one may expect that v is a shortest vector. In practice, the larger the ratio σ/ v is, the easier we can find v. We call this ratio an expected-gap of L with respect to v.
Key Recovery Attack against PJH
Volume of the Lattice Generated by Φ(P 2 )
For a polynomial f ∈ R, let's define V (f ) by the volume of the lattice generated by the circulant matrix Φ(f ). In our attack, V (P 2 ) is used essentially: More precisely, we need to estimate a reasonable lower bound of δ n (P 2 ), which is defined for randomly chosen P 2 by
In this subsection we present a heuristic on the asymptotic estimation of δ n (P 2 ). To our knowledge, it is difficult to understand asymptotic behavior of V (f ) theoretically. For simplicity, suppose that the lattice is of full rank. In that case, V (f ) is equal to the determinant of the circulant matrix Φ(f ). So, we can infer intuitively
However, if there are no conditions on n and f , there are no known theoretical results on asymptotic properties of V (f ). Moreover, we could not find meaningful characteristics even from simulations. Now, turn to our attention to δ n (P 2 ) in PJH. Because PJH uses prime n and P 2 is obtained by special formulas, V (P 2 ) and δ n (P 2 ) behave regularly as n increases. We could verify this by simulations. We calculated δ n (P 2 ) in randomly constructed PJH for several n's and for several 10-bit or 80-bit p's. We tested 100 times for each n and p. The experimental results are shown in Figure 1 . The upper three curves in the figure show the simulated maximum, average, and minimum values of δ n (P 2 ), respectively. They tend to increase linearly as n increases. If the bit-size of p increases, the value of δ n (P 2 ) decreases a little bit. However, as one can see in Figure 1 , the slopes of δ n (P 2 ) do not change much as the bit-size of p increases.
From our simulations, we estimate a lower bound of δ n (P 2 ) for large n and for p ≤ 2 80 very conservatively as follows:
The lowest line in the figure shows the lower bound in (2). In the next subsections, we will use this estimation for theoretical analysis of our attack against PJH.
A Linear Relation Between Key Pairs
Let's recall some of equations in (1).
By multiplying g to (4), we induce the following equation in R:
In (5), g, p and h 1 are unknown variables. However, note that the equation is linear while those in (1) are quadratic. Suppose we can recover h 1 and p. Then, g can be recovered by solving the linear equation (5). From g and p we can obtain g p and Q easily. Then, (1) becomes a system of four linear equations of four unknown variables so that the other secret keys can be recovered easily. Thus, if we can find h 1 and p, we can recover all secret keys of PJH. We will recover them using a lattice technique in the following subsections. Remark 1. PJH can be designed flexibly. In [18] , the authors introduced another scheme which uses the polynomial ring
, and one more in the appendix. However, our attack can be applied identically to the one in Section 4.4, and a modified attack, using the equation
instead of (5), can be applied to the one in the appendix.
Finding h 1 with a Lattice Technique
The Case When p is not Secret Consider a lattice L 1 generated by rows of the following (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix L 1 :
where 0 n is a column vector of dimension n whose entries are all 0. Then, a vector
is contained in L 1 and its length satisfies Table 3 . Breaking times (in seconds) of PJH for 80-bit public p.
Dimension of lattice n =211 n =257 n =373 n =503 n = 1001 Time(Seconds) < 1 < 1 < 10 < 10 < 100
According to Gaussian heuristic we can expect
where σ 1 is the length of a shortest vector in L 1 . Using the approximation of δ n (P 2 ) in (2), we can estimate σ 1 as follows:
Thus, the expected-gap of L 1 with respect to v 1 is bigger than or equal to 0.02np, i.e.,
Since this is very large in PJH parameters, where p is a 10-bit or 80-bit prime, v 1 will be a shortest vector of L 1 with high probability. So, we can easily find v 1 (and hence h 1 ) by using lattice reduction algorithms. We simulated the above attack on a Pentium IV 3.2 GHz PC using the floating-point variant of LLL algorithm (LLL FP) with default parameters implemented in NTL package [17] . We tested our attack against PJH with different n's for 10-bit and 80-bit randomly selected p's. For each n and p, 10 different instances were tested against. We could obtain v for all instances. For 10-bit p's, the running times for lattice reduction were too short to be described. The running times for 80-bit p's are given in Table 3 . Even for n = 1001, we could find the solutions within 100 seconds.
The Case When p is Secret If p is secret, we cannot construct the lattice L 1 . Instead, we consider a lattice L 2 generated by the following matrix L 2 :
Then, a vector v 2 = (h 1 , −p) is contained in L 2 and its length is smaller than or equal to p 2 + n 2 . The σ 2 corresponding to L 2 is equal to σ 1 , and hence σ 2 ≥ 0.02np √ n + 1. Thus, we get
Although this value is smaller than the expected-gap when p is public, it is still large (see Table 5 ). So, we can find v 2 (and hence h 1 , and p) by using lattice reduction algorithms. Table 4 . Breaking times (in seconds) of PJH for 80-bit secret p.
Dimension of lattice n =211 n =257 n =373 n =503 n = 1001 Times(second) < 20 < 30 < 60 < 100 < 500 Table 5 . Expected-gaps in attacks against NTRUEncrypt, GGH, and PJH.
Dimension of the lattice 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 GGH [12] 9.7 9.4 9.5 9.4 9.6 NTRUEncrypt [7] 5.7 6.3 6.9 7.5 8.0 8.5 8.9 PJH(secret p) [From (7) We also simulated the above attack on the same machine using the same algorithm as in the previous case. The results for 80-bit p's are given in Table 4 . The running times for lattice reduction in this case were more longer than those in case of public p. This was expected because the expected-gap of the former is smaller than that of the latter. Still, we could find the solutions within 500 seconds even for n = 1001 .
Remark 2. We can use another lattice in our attack to get larger expected-gap. Let d p be the bit-length of p, and consider a vector v 3 = (2 dp h 1 , −p) and a lattice L 3 generated by the following matrix L 3 :
2 dp Φ(P 2 ) 0 n 2 dp P 1 1 .
Then, v 3 is a short vector of L 3 and the expected-gap of L 3 with respect to v 3 is about δ n (P 2 )p. However, since the entries of L 3 is larger than those of L 2 , it takes more time in lattice reduction for L 3 than for L 2 . Thus, using L 2 is more efficient in practice.
Attack against PJH with Larger Parameters
In attack against GGH, expected-gaps are small and do not increase as the lattice dimension n increases [12] , and in attack against NTRUEncrypt, they increase but are bounded by about 0.25 √ n [7] . On the other hand, the efficiency of reduction algorithm becomes worse as n increases. These two facts cause the difficulty in attacking GGH and NTRUEncrypt when n is sufficiently large [3, 6, 12] . The attacks are not possible practically when n is more than 400 ∼ 500.
However, expected-gaps in our attack against PJH are much large and increase very fast as n increases. The comparison of expected-gaps in attacks against GGH, NTRUEncrypt, and PJH are given in Table 5 . The large expectedgaps explains why breaking times of PJH are shorter compared to other systems.
Moreover, the fact that the expected-gaps increases fast compensates the inefficiency of reduction algorithms for large n. Thus, we expect that we can break PJH until n grows too large to be used practically.
Conclusion
We have shown that Paeng-Jung-Ha cryptosystem proposed at PKC 2003 is not secure against a lattice attack contrary to proposer's expectation. From the relations between public keys and secret keys, we could induce a linear equation useful for a lattice attack. Because the breaking times for suggested parameters are drastically short and the feasibility of our attack against the system with larger parameters is high, we may declare that the system should not be used practically.
It seems to be hard to modify PJH to be secure against our attack without worsening the efficiency. Our result shows that, although lattice-based cryptosystems look attractive, it is difficult to design a practical system other than NTRUEncrypt.
